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Background:	  That	  delusional	  and	  delusion-­‐prone	  individuals	  “jump	  to	  conclusions”	  is	  one	  of	  
the	  most	   robust	  and	   important	   findings	   in	   the	   literature	  on	  delusions.	  However,	   although	  
the	   notion	   of	   “jumping	   to	   conclusions”	   (JTC)	   implies	   gathering	   insufficient	   evidence	   and	  
reaching	  premature	  decisions,	  previous	  studies	  have	  not	  investigated	  whether	  the	  evidence	  
gathering	  of	  delusion-­‐prone	   individuals	   is,	   in	   fact,	  suboptimal.	  The	  standard	  JTC	  effect	   is	  a	  
relative	   effect,	   but	   using	   relative	   comparisons	   to	   substantiate	   absolute	   claims	   is	  
problematic.	   In	   this	   study	   we	   investigated	   whether	   delusion-­‐prone	   participants	   jump	   to	  
conclusions	  in	  both	  a	  relative	  and	  absolute	  sense.	  	  
Methods:	   Healthy	   participants	   (n=112)	   completed	   an	   incentivised	   probabilistic	   reasoning	  
task,	   in	   which	   correct	   decisions	   were	   rewarded	   and	   additional	   information	   could	   be	  
requested	   for	   a	   small	   price.	   This	   combination	   of	   rewards	   and	   costs	   generated	   optimal	  
decision	  points.	  Participants	  also	   completed	  measures	  of	  delusion-­‐proneness,	   intelligence,	  
and	  risk	  aversion.	  
Results:	   Replicating	   the	   standard	   relative	   finding,	   we	   found	   that	   delusion-­‐proneness	  
significantly	  predicted	  task	  decisions,	  such	  that	  the	  more	  delusion-­‐prone	  participants	  were,	  
the	   earlier	   they	   decided.	   This	   finding	  was	   robust	   when	   accounting	   for	   the	   effects	   of	   risk	  
aversion	   and	   intelligence.	   Importantly,	   high-­‐delusion-­‐prone	   participants	   also	   decided	   in	  
advance	  of	  an	  objective	  rational	  optimum,	  gathering	  less	  data	  than	  would	  have	  maximised	  
their	   expected	   payoff.	   Surprisingly,	   we	   found	   that	   even	   low-­‐delusion-­‐prone	   participants	  




Conclusions:	  Our	  findings	  support	  and	  clarify	  the	  claim	  that	  delusion	  formation	  is	  associated	  
with	  a	   tendency	   to	  “jump	  to	  conclusions”.	   In	  short,	  most	  people	   jump	  to	  conclusions,	  but	  
more	  delusion-­‐prone	  individuals	  “jump	  further”.	  
	  
Keywords:	   decision-­‐making;	   delusions;	   delusion-­‐proneness;	   jumping	   to	   conclusions;	  
experimental	  economics.	  






In	  a	  now	  classic	  study,	  psychiatric	  patients	  suffering	  from	  delusions	  observed	  a	  researcher	  
draw	   coloured	  beads	   from	  one	  of	   two	  hidden	   jars	   –	   a	  mostly	   pink	   jar	   (85	  pink	   beads,	   15	  
green	  beads)	  or	  a	  mostly	  green	  jar	  (85	  green,	  15	  pink).	  The	  patients	  had	  to	  decide	  which	  jar	  
the	   beads	   were	   being	   drawn	   from	   and	   to	   indicate	   when	   they	   were	   ready	   to	   make	   this	  
decision.	  Relative	  to	  control	  participants,	  deluded	   individuals	  required	  fewer	  draws	  before	  
making	  a	  decision	  (Huq	  et	  al.,	  1988).	  This	  effect,	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  “jumping-­‐to-­‐conclusions	  
bias”	  (JTC	  bias),	  has	  been	  replicated	  numerous	  times	  with	  both	  deluded	  and	  delusion-­‐prone	  
participants	  (Colbert	  and	  Peters,	  2002,	  Moritz	  and	  Woodward,	  2005).	  As	  a	  result,	  a	  tendency	  
to	  gather	  insufficient	  evidence	  when	  forming	  beliefs	  and	  making	  decisions	  is	  thought	  to	  be	  a	  
core	   cognitive	   component	   of	   delusion	   formation	   (Fine	   et	   al.,	   2007,	   Garety	   and	   Freeman,	  
2013).	  
However,	  although	  the	  JTC	  effect	  is	  well	  replicated	  and	  robust	  to	  many	  modifications	  of	  the	  
basic	  “beads	  task”	  paradigm,	  there	  are	  some	  fundamental	  limitations	  with	  the	  way	  this	  task	  
is	  typically	  administered	  that	  call	  the	  above	  interpretation	  into	  question.	  The	  key	  problem	  is	  
that	  the	  term	  “jumping	  to	  conclusions”	  implies	  gathering	  insufficient	  evidence	  and	  reaching	  
decisions	   prematurely,	   yet	   the	   standard	   JTC	   effect	   is	   a	   relative	   effect.	   The	   notions	   of	  
premature	  and	  late	  decisions	  are	  only	  meaningful	  if	  there	  is	  some	  optimal	  point	  at	  which	  a	  
rational	   individual	  should	  decide	  –	  and	  for	  such	  a	  point	  to	  exist	  there	  needs	  to	  be	  both	  an	  
(opportunity)	   cost	   of	   incorrect	   decisions	   and	   a	   cost	   associated	   with	   collecting	   extra	  
information.	   Investigations	   using	   the	   beads	   task	   paradigm	   typically	   make	   no	   attempt	   to	  




previous	  study	  has	  incorporated	  both	  of	  these	  elements.	  Without	  these	  aspects	  there	  is	  no	  
objective	  basis	   for	   the	  decision	   to	   stop	   collecting	  data.	  As	   a	   result,	   although	  deluded	  and	  
delusion-­‐prone	  participants	  may	  “reach	  conclusions”	  on	  this	  task	  more	  quickly	  than	  control	  
participants	  (gathering	   less	  evidence),	   the	  standard	  unincentivised	  paradigm	  cannot	   justify	  
the	  suggestion	  that	  they	  “jump	  to	  conclusions”	  (objectively	  suboptimal	  evidence	  gathering).	  
To	   illustrate	   this	   point	   using	   a	   different	   example	   from	   the	   clinical	   literature,	   consider	   the	  
relationship	  between	  depression	  and	  rational	  belief.	  It	  is	  well	  known	  that,	  relative	  to	  healthy	  
individuals,	  depressed	  individuals	  have	  negative	  thoughts	  and	  expectations	  about	  the	  future	  
(Beck,	   1976).	  One	  might	   assume	   that	  whereas	   healthy	   individuals	   are	   essentially	   rational,	  
depressed	  individuals	  have	  beliefs	  that	  are	  unwarrantedly	  pessimistic	  –	  perhaps	  they	  update	  
their	   beliefs	   about	   future	   outcomes	   in	   a	   distorted	   fashion.	   However,	   recent	   research	   has	  
clarified	   that	   healthy	   individuals	   have	   distorted	   beliefs	   about	   the	   future,	   being	   relatively	  
disinclined	  to	  revise	  their	  beliefs	  in	  response	  to	  undesirable	  information	  (see,	  e.g.,	  Sharot	  et	  
al.,	   2011,	   Eil	   and	   Rao,	   2012).	   Indeed,	   there	   is	   even	   evidence	   that	   people	   with	   mild	  
depression	   show	   no	   bias	   when	   predicting	   future	   events	   (Sharot,	   2011,	   Garrett	   et	   al.,	   in	  
press).	  This	  research	  demonstrates	  the	  perils	  of	  using	  relative	  comparisons	  to	  substantiate	  
claims	   about	   deviations	   from	   rationality	   (Shah,	   2012).	   In	   order	   to	   show	   that	   a	   particular	  
group	   of	   people	   is	   irrational,	   one	  must	   compare	   their	   beliefs	   and	   decisions	   to	   a	   rational	  
standard	  –	  not	  simply	  to	  those	  of	  a	  different	  group.	  	  
In	   the	   present	   study,	  we	   incorporated	   rigorous	   procedures	   from	   experimental	   economics	  
(e.g.,	   monetary	   incentives,	   decision-­‐theoretic	   analysis,	   detailed	   written	   instructions	   and	  
comprehension	  checks,	  absence	  of	  deception)	  to	  address	  these	  issues.	  We	  set	  both	  the	  cost	  




equal	  for	  all	  participants.	  To	  make	  the	  task	  more	  relatable	  and	  engaging	  we	  used	  the	  “lakes	  
and	   fish”	  adaptation	  of	   the	  beads	   task	   (Speechley	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  On	  each	   trial,	  participants	  
were	  shown	  a	  fisherman	  who	  had	  caught	  a	  series	  of	  fish	  from	  one	  of	  two	  lakes	  (Figure	  1).	  
After	  seeing	  a	  fish	  from	  his	  catch,	  participants	  had	  the	  opportunity	  to	  see	  another	  fish	  or	  to	  
decide	  which	   lake	  was	   the	   source	   of	   all	   fish	   in	   the	   series.	   Choosing	   the	   correct	   lake	  was	  
rewarded,	   but	   a	   small	   cost	  was	   incurred	   for	   each	   additional	   fish	   seen	   before	  making	   this	  
decision.	  This	  combination	  of	  rewards	  and	  costs	  generated	  optimal	  decision	  points	  –	  points	  
at	   which	   expected	   payoff	   was	   maximal.1	   In	   line	   with	   the	   standard,	   relative,	   “jumping	   to	  
conclusions”	   effect,	   we	   hypothesised	   that	   delusion-­‐proneness	   would	   significantly	   predict	  
decisions	  in	  this	  task	  (controlling	  for	  intelligence	  and	  risk	  aversion),	  such	  that	  more	  delusion-­‐
prone	  participants	  would	  decide	  after	  seeing	  fewer	  fish.	  Importantly,	  we	  also	  hypothesised	  
that	  delusion-­‐prone	  individuals	  would	  make	  objectively	  premature	  decisions,	   i.e.,	  decisions	  
made	  in	  advance	  of	  the	  point	  at	  which	  expected	  payoff	  would	  be	  maximal.	  Only	  by	  testing	  
the	  latter	  hypothesis	  could	  we	  confirm	  whether	  delusion-­‐prone	  individuals	  do	  in	  fact	  jump	  
to	  conclusions.	  
	  




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Strictly	  speaking	  these	  decision	  points	  are	  only	  “optimal”	  from	  a	  risk-­‐neutral	  perspective.	  Risk-­‐seeking	  or	  risk-­‐
averse	   individuals	  may	  make	   decisions	   that	   fail	   to	  maximise	   their	   expected	   outcome,	   but	   that	   nevertheless	  





Participants	  (n=112,	  59	  females,	  53	  males;	  mean	  age	  =	  19.94,	  SD	  =	  2.92)	  were	  students	  at	  
Royal	  Holloway,	  University	  of	  London,	  recruited	  online	  (ORSEE;	  Greiner,	  2004).	  Participants	  
received	  £6	  for	  participation	  and	  a	  decision-­‐based	  bonus.	  The	  Psychology	  Department	  Ethics	  
Committee	  of	  Royal	  Holloway,	  University	  of	  London	  approved	  the	  study.	  
2.2 Materials	  
2.2.1 Lakes	  and	  fish	  task	  
Before	  the	  start	  of	  the	  experiment,	  participants	  were	   issued	  written	   instructions	  providing	  
information	  about	  the	  ratios	  of	  black	  to	  white	  fish	  in	  the	  two	  lakes	  (i.e.,	  25:75	  or	  75:25),	  the	  
incentive	   structure	   (rewards	  and	   costs),	   and	   the	  means	  of	   responding.	   It	  was	  emphasised	  
that	  on	  a	  given	  fishing	  trip	  (corresponding	  to	  a	  trial;	  see	  below)	  the	  fisherman	  visited	  one	  of	  
the	   lakes	   only	   and	   was	   equally	   likely	   to	   visit	   either	   lake.	   These	   instructions	   and	   the	  
comprehension	   checks	   that	   followed	   them	   were	   incorporated	   to	   minimise	   poor	   task	  
comprehension,	  which	  has	  been	   shown	   to	   influence	   the	   JTC	  bias	   (Moritz	   and	  Woodward,	  
2005,	  Balzan	  et	  al.,	  2012a,	  Balzan	  et	  al.,	  2012b).	  Visual	  stimuli	  were	  based	  on	  those	  used	  by	  
Speechley	  et	  al.	  (2010).	  Moreover,	  we	  aimed	  to	  reduce	  cognitive	  load	  through	  visual	  stimuli	  
which	   included	  explicit	   reminders	  of	   the	  ratios	   in	   the	   lakes,	  points	   to	  be	  earned	  and	  paid,	  
and	   a	   string	   of	   the	   previously	   seen	   fish	   to	   avoid	   the	   confound	   of	   potentially	   impaired	  
working	  memory	  (Dudley	  et	  al.,	  1997b,	  Moritz	  et	  al.,	  2007,	  Garety	  et	  al.,	  2013).	  We	  used	  the	  
ratio	   of	   25:75,	   rather	   than	   the	   15:85	   ratio	   used	   by	   Huq	   et	   al.	   (1988),	   to	   create	   optimal	  
decision	  points	  later	  in	  the	  sequence.	  
After	  participants	  were	  shown	  the	  first	  fish	  from	  the	  fisherman’s	  catch,	  they	  had	  the	  choice	  




£0.05).	  They	  could	  request	  to	  see	  additional	  fish	  until	  they	  either	  decided	  on	  a	  lake	  or	  all	  fish	  
in	   the	   catch	   were	   shown	   (max.	   17),	   after	   which	   they	   were	   forced	   to	   decide	   on	   a	   lake.	  
Choosing	  the	  correct	  lake	  earned	  them	  a	  reward	  (100	  points).	  This	  procedure	  was	  repeated	  
for	  six	  series	  of	  fish	  (trials).	  The	  first	  trial	  consisted	  of	  a	  randomly	  drawn	  series	  of	  fish2	  and	  
was	  used	  for	  pay-­‐out	  (participants	  were	  informed	  that	  the	  series	  of	  fish	  on	  one	  trial	  would	  
be	   drawn	   at	   random	   and	   that	   they	   would	   be	   paid	   based	   on	   their	   performance	   on	   this	  
particular	  trial;	  they	  did	  not,	  however,	  know	  which	  of	  the	  six	  trials	  was	  the	  random	  trial3).	  
The	   next	   five	   trials	   were	   tailored	   to	   have	   varying	   optimal	   decision	   points.	   The	   optimal	  
decision	  point	  was	  always	  reached	  at	  a	  difference	  of	  three	  fish	  of	  the	  majority	  colour	  over	  
the	  minority	  colour	   (see	  Appendix	   for	   the	  calculation	  of	   the	  optimal	  decision	  point).	  After	  
this	   point,	   unbeknown	   to	   the	   participants,	   all	   subsequent	   fish	   in	   the	   trial	   were	   of	   the	  
majority	  colour,	  so	  as	  to	  strengthen	  the	  stopping	  rule	  and	  to	  avoid	  introducing	  contradictory	  
evidence	  once	   the	  optimal	  point	  was	   reached.	  The	   sequences	  of	   fish	   in	  each	  non-­‐random	  
trial,	  including	  the	  optimal	  decision	  points,	  are	  shown	  in	  Table	  1.	  
	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐	  Insert	  Table	  1	  about	  here	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	  
	  
2.2.2 Delusion-­‐proneness	  
We	  used	  the	  21-­‐item	  Peters	  et	  al.	  Delusions	  Inventory	  (PDI;	  Peters	  et	  al.,	  2004)	  to	  measure	  
delusional	   ideation.	   Sample	   items	   include	   “Do	   you	   ever	   feel	   as	   if	   there	   is	   a	   conspiracy	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  To	  clarify:	  one	  of	  the	  two	  lakes	  was	  selected	  at	  random	  (each	  lake	  being	  equiprobable)	  and	  a	  sequence	  of	  fish	  
was	  drawn	  at	  random	  from	  that	  lake,	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  ratios	  of	  black	  and	  white	  fish	  in	  that	  lake	  (i.e.,	  if	  
the	  mostly	  black	  lake	  was	  selected,	  each	  fish	  drawn	  was	  black	  with	  probability	  0.75).	  
3	  By	  including	  this	  truly	  random	  sequence	  we	  avoided	  deceiving	  our	  participants	  and	  thus	  conformed	  to	  a	  key	  




against	  you?”	  and	  “Do	  your	  thoughts	  ever	  feel	  alien	  to	  you	  in	  some	  way?”	  For	  each	  yes/no	  
item	  endorsed,	  participants	  are	  required	  to	   indicate	  their	   levels	  of	  distress,	  preoccupation	  
and	   conviction	   for	   that	   item	   on	   5-­‐point	   scales.	   The	   yes/no	   endorsement	   summed	   scores	  
range	   from	   0-­‐21;	   the	   separate	   dimensions’	   summed	   scores	   from	   0-­‐105;	   and	   the	   total	  
summed	  scores	  from	  0-­‐336.	  
2.2.3 Intelligence	  
We	   used	   the	   12-­‐item	   version	   of	   Raven’s	   advanced	   progressive	   matrices	   (12-­‐APM)	   to	  
measure	   intelligence	  (Arthur	  and	  Day,	  1994).	  A	  time	   limit	  of	  15	  minutes	  was	  set	   for	   these	  
twelve	   items.	   Intelligence	   was	   defined	   as	   the	   total	   number	   of	   correctly	   answered	   items	  
(APM-­‐scores).	  	  
2.2.4 Risk	  aversion	  
We	  used	  Holt	  and	  Laury’s	  (2002)	  measure	  to	  gauge	  how	  risk	  averse	  participants	  were.	  This	  
measure	   involves	   ten	   decisions	   between	   two	   gambles,	   for	   example	   a	   decision	   between	  
Option	  A	  “a	  4/10	  chance	  of	  winning	  £2.00,	  a	  6/10	  chance	  of	  winning	  £1.60”	  and	  Option	  B	  “a	  
4/10	  chance	  of	  winning	  £3.85,	  a	  6/10	  chance	  of	  winning	  £0.10”	  (Holt	  and	  Laury,	  2002,	  based	  
on	  p.	  1645).	  With	  each	   successive	  decision,	   the	  probability	  of	   the	  high	  payoff	  outcome	   in	  
each	   option	   increases	   by	   10%,	   such	   that	   the	   expected	   value	   of	   the	   “risky”	   Option	   B	  
increases.	  Risk	  aversion	  was	  defined	  as	  the	  total	  number	  of	  times	  Option	  A	  was	  chosen,	  so	  
that	  the	  higher	  the	  scores,	  the	  higher	  the	  risk	  aversion.	  
2.3 Procedure	  
Participants	  were	  tested	  in	  groups	  ranging	  from	  20-­‐26	  people.	  All	  sessions	  were	  conducted	  
on	  a	   local	   computer	  network	  using	   z-­‐Tree	   software	   (Fischbacher,	   2007)	   in	   the	  EconLab	  at	  




questions	  based	  on	  detailed	  instructions,	  participants	  started	  the	  task.	  As	  mentioned	  above,	  
the	   first	   trial	  was	   always	   a	   truly	   random	  sequence.	   The	  next	   five	   trials	  were	  presented	   in	  
counterbalanced	   order	   across	   sessions.	   Incomplete	   counterbalancing	   was	   accomplished	  
using	  a	  Latin	  square	  procedure	  to	  maximise	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  trial	  orders	  across	  
the	  five	  sessions.	  The	  first	  decision	  (i.e.,	  see	  another	  fish	  or	  decide	  on	  a	  lake)	  in	  the	  first	  trial	  
had	  a	  time	  limit	  of	  60	  seconds,	  to	  allow	  participants	  to	  get	  acquainted	  with	  the	  task	  (note	  
that	  this	  trial	  was	  not	  analysed).	  To	  discourage	  participants	  from	  making	  formal	  calculations	  
(e.g.,	  using	  mobile	  phones),	  each	  subsequent	  decision	  (i.e.,	  see	  another	  fish	  or	  decide	  on	  a	  
lake)	  in	  that	  trial	  and	  all	  decisions	  in	  subsequent	  trials	  had	  a	  time	  limit	  of	  20	  seconds.	  Once	  
all	  participants	  completed	  the	  task,	  a	  different	  decision	  task	  was	  presented	  (to	  be	  reported	  
elsewhere;	   Van	   der	   Leer	   et	   al.,	   in	   prep).	   Then,	   participants	   completed	   the	   risk	   aversion	  
measure,	  next	  the	  PDI,	  followed	  by	  the	  12-­‐APM,	  and	  finally	  some	  demographic	  questions.	  	  
2.4 Statistical	  analyses	  
There	  were	  two	  types	  of	  decision	  in	  our	  study	  (as	  in	  all	  beads	  task	  studies).	  First,	  after	  each	  
fish	   was	   presented,	   participants	   had	   to	   decide	   whether	   or	   not	   to	   sample	   a	   further	   fish.	  
Second,	  once	  they	  had	  decided	  not	  to	  sample	  any	  more	  fish	  (or	  when	  they	  had	  reached	  the	  
end	  of	  the	  sequence),	  they	  had	  to	  decide	  which	  of	  the	  two	  lakes	  the	  fisherman	  was	  fishing	  
from	   (‘lake	   decision’).	   The	   former	   decisions	   were	   of	   primary	   interest,	   as	   the	   number	   of	  
pieces	   of	   information	   (fish,	   in	   this	   case)	   that	   are	   requested	   (the	   number	   of	   “draws	   to	  
decision”)	  comprises	  the	  main	  dependent	  measure	   in	  studies	  of	  “jumping	  to	  conclusions.”	  
To	   investigate	   relative	   effects	   of	   delusion-­‐proneness	   we	   regressed	   draws	   to	   decision	   on	  
total	   summed	   PDI-­‐scores	   (McKay	   et	   al.,	   2006).	  We	   ran	   sequential	   regression	   analyses	   to	  




Our	   paradigm,	   however,	   enables	   more	   than	   just	   relative	   comparisons.	   The	   incentive	  
structure	  of	  our	  task	  (incorporating	  both	  rewards	  and	  costs)	  generates	  an	  optimal	  decision	  
point	   for	   any	   given	   sequence	   of	   fish	   (i.e.,	   an	   optimal	   number	   of	   draws	   to	   take	   before	  
deciding	  which	  of	  the	  two	  lakes	  the	  fisherman	  was	  fishing	  from).	  To	  investigate	  objectively	  
premature	  decisions	  (bona	  fide	  “jumps	  to	  conclusions”)	  we	  compared	  participants’	  decision	  
points	  to	  the	  optimal	  decision	  points	  across	  the	  five	  non-­‐random	  trials,	  using	  one-­‐sample	  t-­‐
tests.	  We	  investigated	  whether	  objectively	  premature	  decisions	  were	  made	  by	  our	  sample	  
as	  a	  whole,	  and/or	  by	  low-­‐	  and	  high-­‐delusion-­‐prone	  subsets	  of	  the	  sample.	  	  
3 Results	  
	  
3.1 Data	  screening	  
There	   was	   no	   multicollinearity	   between	   predictor	   variables	   and	   predictors	   were	   linearly	  
related	  with	  the	  outcome	  variable.	  Residuals	  were	  normally	  distributed,	  and	  the	  assumption	  
of	  homoscedasticity	  was	  met.	  One	  PDI-­‐score	  was	  an	  outlier	  according	   to	   the	  Mahalanobis	  
distance	  criterion,	  but	  it	  was	  a	  valid	  score	  (i.e.,	  well	  within	  the	  range	  of	  possible	  scores)	  so	  
we	  included	  it	  and	  applied	  a	  square-­‐root	  transformation.	  After	  this	  transformation	  no	  more	  
outliers	   were	   detected	   through	   Cook’s	   and	   Mahalanobis’	   distances;	   the	   standardised	  
residuals	  indicated	  that	  fewer	  than	  5%	  of	  participants	  were	  outliers	  (Field,	  2009).	  
3.2 Descriptive	  statistics	  
Descriptive	  statistics	  for	  risk	  aversion,	  PDI-­‐scores,	  and	  APM-­‐scores	  are	  provided	  in	  Table	  2.	  
PDI-­‐scores	  were	  not	  significantly	  different	  between	  males	  (mean	  =	  68.83,	  SD	  =	  43.137)	  and	  
females	  (mean	  =	  80.66,	  SD	  =	  37.691),	  t(110)=1.816,	  p=.072.	  Table	  1	  depicts	  the	  numbers	  of	  




Jolley	   et	   al.	   (2014),	   we	   defined	   two	   types	   of	   lake	   decision	   errors:	   deciding	   when	   the	  
evidence	  collected	  to	  that	  point	  favoured	  neither	  lake	  (‘equivocal	  errors’)	  and	  deciding	  on	  a	  
lake	   that	  was	  disfavoured	   by	   the	   evidence	   collected	   to	   that	   point	   (‘inconsistent	   errors’)4.	  
Table	  3	  reports	  the	  mean	  draws	  to	  decision	  in	  each	  sequence.	  
	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐	  Insert	  Tables	  2	  and	  3	  about	  here	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	  
	  
3.3 Lakes	  and	  fish	  task	  
3.3.1 Relative	  effects	  
PDI-­‐scores	   were	   a	   significant	   predictor	   of	   draws	   to	   decision,	   F(1,110)=5.520,	   p=.021,	  
R²adjusted=.039	   (see	   Table	   4,	   Model	   1).	   The	   higher	   a	   participant’s	   PDI-­‐score,	   the	   earlier	  
decisions	  were	  made.	  
A	   sequential	   regression	   was	   subsequently	   run	   to	   investigate	   whether	   adding	   PDI-­‐scores	  
could	  predict	  additional	  variance	  not	  already	  accounted	  for	  by	  intelligence	  and	  risk	  aversion.	  
Intelligence	  was	  a	  significant	  predictor	  of	  draws	  to	  decision	  in	  both	  models,	  but	  the	  addition	  
of	   PDI-­‐scores	   significantly	   improved	   the	   model,	   ΔF(1,108)=6.128,	   Δp=.015,	   ΔR²=.042;	  
F(3,108)=12.076,	  p<.001,	  R²adjusted=.230	  (see	  Table	  4,	  Model	  2;	  and	  Figure	  2).5	  Risk-­‐aversion	  
was	  not	  a	   significant	  predictor	  of	  draws	   to	  decision	   in	  either	  model	  and	  did	  not	   correlate	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  In	  evaluating	  these	  errors,	  what	  matters	  is	  the	  evidence	  collected	  up	  to	  the	  point	  of	  the	  lake	  decision,	  not	  the	  
evidence	  available	  in	  the	  full	  sequence.	  For	  example,	  in	  Sequence	  E	  a	  participant	  who	  sampled	  five	  fish	  (B-­‐W-­‐
B-­‐W-­‐W)	  and	  then	  decided	  on	  the	  mostly	  black	  lake	  made	  an	  inconsistent	  error,	  even	  though	  every	  subsequent	  
fish	  in	  that	  sequence	  was	  black.	  
5	  Although	  we	  analysed	  transformed	  data,	  we	  checked	  whether	  the	  same	  results	  obtained	  when	  excluding	  the	  
data	   point	   that	   comprised	   an	   outlier	   for	   untransformed	   data.	   Without	   this	   data	   point,	   PDI-­‐scores	   still	  
significantly	  predicted	  draws	  to	  decision	  both	  as	  the	  sole	  predictor	  (F(1,109)=4.150,	  p=.044,	  R²adjusted=.028)	  and	  
when	   accounting	   for	   risk-­‐aversion	   and	   intelligence	   (ΔF(1,107)=5.413,	   Δp=.022,	   ΔR²=.038;	   F(3,107)=11.262,	  




with	  draws	  to	  decision	  when	  considered	  alone	  (r[112]=.032,	  p=.741).	  We	  thus	  replicate	  the	  
standard,	   relative,	   JTC	   finding	   in	   a	   fully	   incentivised	   paradigm:	   higher	   delusion-­‐proneness	  
was	   associated	   with	   earlier	   decisions	   on	   the	   task,	   even	   accounting	   for	   risk	   aversion	   and	  
intelligence.6	  
	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐	  Insert	  Table	  4	  and	  Figure	  2	  about	  here	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	  
	  
3.3.2 Absolute	  effects	  
Considered	   as	   a	   whole,	   participants	   in	   our	   sample	   gathered	   significantly	   fewer	   pieces	   of	  
information	   than	   would	   have	   been	   optimal,	   i.e.,	   they	   jumped	   to	   conclusions	   (mean	  
deviation	   from	   optimal	   number	   of	   fish=-­‐2.566,	   SD=1.75,	   t[111]=15.506,	   p<.001).7,8	   To	  
further	   investigate	   whether	   this	   effect	   was	   limited	   to	   participants	   high	   in	   delusion-­‐
proneness,	  we	  divided	  participants	  into	  low-­‐delusion-­‐prone	  and	  high-­‐delusion-­‐prone	  groups	  
based	  on	  a	  quartile	   split	  of	   their	   continuous	  PDI-­‐scores	   (as	  per	  Colbert	  and	  Peters,	  2002).	  
We	   then	   conducted	   separate	   one-­‐sample	   t-­‐tests	   to	   investigate	  whether	   each	   group	  drew	  
significantly	  fewer	  fish	  than	  would	  have	  been	  optimal.	  These	  tests	  revealed	  that	  both	  groups	  
of	  participants	  jumped	  to	  conclusions	  (mean	  deviation	  from	  optimal	  for	  low-­‐delusion-­‐prone	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  Although	  there	  were	  no	  significant	  differences	  between	  males	  and	  females	  for	  PDI-­‐scores,	  for	  robustness	  an	  
additional	  sequential	  regression	  was	  conducted.	  Adding	  PDI-­‐scores	  as	  a	  fourth	  predictor	  significantly	  improved	  
a	   previous	   model	   with	   gender,	   risk-­‐aversion,	   and	   intelligence	   as	   the	   three	   predictors	   (ΔF(1,107)=4.024,	  
Δp=.047,	  ΔR²=.027;	  F(4,107)=11.077,	  p<.001,	  R²adjusted=.266).	  
7	  Negative	  and	  positive	  deviations	  indicate	  early	  and	  late	  decisions,	  respectively.	  
8	  This	  result	  was	  also	  found	  when	  excluding	  the	  outlier	  on	  untransformed	  data:	  mean	  deviation	  =	  -­‐2.546,	  SD	  =	  




participants	   [PDI<46]=-­‐1.946,	   SD=1.679,	   t[25]=5.912,	   p<.001;	   mean	   deviation	   for	   high-­‐
delusion-­‐prone	  participants	  [PDI>95]=-­‐2.993,	  SD=2.018,	  t[28]=	  7.987,	  p<.001).9,10	  
These	   deviations	   from	   optimal	   decision	   points	   could	   have	   had	   considerable	   financial	  
consequences.	  For	  Bayesian	   individuals,	  deciding	  at	  the	  optimal	  point	  would	  have	   led	  to	  a	  
gain	   in	   expected	   value	   of	   10.6	   points	   compared	   to	   deciding	   after	   seeing	   just	   one	   fish	  
(averaged	  across	  the	  non-­‐random	  trials).	  On	  average,	  however,	  our	  participants	  would	  have	  
forgone	  more	  than	  80%	  of	  this	  potential	  gain	  if	  these	  trials	  had	  been	  used	  for	  payout.	  
4 Discussion	  
	  
That	  delusional	  and	  delusion-­‐prone	  individuals	  “jump	  to	  conclusions”	  (JTC)	  on	  probabilistic	  
reasoning	  tasks	  is	  perhaps	  the	  most	  important	  and	  influential	  claim	  in	  the	  entire	  literature	  
on	  cognitive	  theories	  of	  delusions.	  Surprisingly,	  however,	  although	  the	  notion	  of	  “jumping	  to	  
conclusions”	  implies	  that	  delusion-­‐prone	  individuals	  gather	  insufficient	  evidence	  and	  reach	  
premature	  decisions,	  no	  previous	  study	  has	  investigated	  whether	  the	  evidence	  gathering	  of	  
such	  individuals	  is,	  in	  fact,	  suboptimal.	  The	  standard	  JTC	  effect	  is	  a	  relative	  effect,	  but	  using	  
relative	   comparisons	   to	   substantiate	   absolute	   claims	   is	   problematic	   (Shah,	   2012).	   Bankers	  
may	  earn	  less	  money	  than	  film	  stars,	  but	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  they	  have	  “insufficient	  money”;	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	   The	   high-­‐delusion-­‐prone	   participants	   decided	   significantly	   earlier	   (and	   thus	   deviated	   significantly	   further	  
from	  optimal	  decisions)	  than	  the	  low-­‐delusion-­‐prone	  participants,	  F(1,53)=4.317,	  p=.043	  (two-­‐tailed),	  ηp²=.075.	  
This	  was	  also	  the	  case	  when	  risk	  aversion	  and	  intelligence	  were	  accounted	  for	   in	  an	  ANCOVA,	  F(1,51)=5.725,	  
p=.020,	  (two-­‐tailed),	  ηp²=.101.	  
10	   As	   the	  median	   PDI	   score	   in	   our	   sample	  was	   higher	   than	   in	   Colbert	   and	   Peters’	   (2002)	   sample,	   one	   could	  
query	  the	  validity	  of	  our	  “low-­‐delusion-­‐prone”	  group.	  For	  this	  reason	  we	  repeated	  these	  analyses	  using	  groups	  
based	  on	  Colbert	  and	  Peters’	  quartile	  values.	  One-­‐sample	  t-­‐tests	  again	  showed	  that	  both	  groups	  of	  participants	  
jumped	   to	   conclusions	   (mean	   deviation	   for	   low-­‐delusion-­‐prone	   participants	   [PDI<34.5]=-­‐2.0615,	   SD=1.357,	  





likewise,	  the	  finding	  that	  delusion-­‐prone	  individuals	  gather	  less	  data	  than	  controls	  does	  not	  
mean	  they	  gather	  insufficient	  data	  –	  this	  is	  an	  empirical	  question,	  hitherto	  unaddressed.	  
In	   the	   present	   study,	   we	   investigated	   evidence	   gathering	   using	   an	   incentivised	   task	  
modelled	  after	  the	  classic	  beads	  task,	  the	  paradigm	  most	  commonly	  used	  to	  study	  the	  JTC	  
bias.	  After	  observing	   the	  colour	  of	  a	   fish	  caught	   from	  one	  of	   two	   lakes,	  participants	  could	  
choose	  to	  see	  further	  fish	  or	  to	  decide	  on	  one	  of	  the	  lakes	  as	  the	  source	  of	  the	  sequence	  of	  
fish.	   We	   rewarded	   correct	   decisions	   but	   imposed	   costs	   for	   gathering	   extra	   information	  
(seeing	   additional	   fish).	   This	   combination	   of	   rewards	   and	   costs	   generated	   an	   optimal	  
number	  of	  “draws	  to	  decision”	  for	  each	  sequence	  of	  fish,	  i.e.,	  a	  number	  of	  draws	  that	  would	  
maximise	   expected	   payoff.	  We	   found	   that	  more	   delusion-­‐prone	   participants	  made	   earlier	  
decisions,	  even	  when	  accounting	  for	  risk	  aversion	  and	  intelligence.	  This	  result	  replicates	  the	  
standard	  relative	   JTC	  finding,	  and	   indicates	  that	  this	  standard	  finding	   is	  not	  attributable	  to	  
differences	   in	   intelligence	   or	   risk	   preferences	   (although	   we	   found	   that	   intelligence	   did	  
significantly	   affect	   JTC,	   as	   did	   Falcone	   et	   al.,	   2014).	   Importantly,	   high-­‐delusion-­‐prone	  
participants	  also	  decided	   in	  advance	  of	  an	  objective	  rational	  optimum,	  gathering	   less	  data	  
than	   they	   should	  have	   in	  order	   to	  maximise	   their	  expected	  payoff.	  This	   reflects	  bona	   fide	  
“jumping	  to	  conclusions”.	  Surprisingly,	  we	  found	  that	  even	  low-­‐delusion-­‐prone	  participants	  
jumped	  to	  conclusions	  in	  this	  objective,	  absolute	  sense,	  gathering	  significantly	  fewer	  pieces	  
of	   information	   than	   would	   have	   been	   rationally	   optimal.	   By	   deciding	   too	   quickly,	  
participants	  forwent	  more	  than	  80%	  of	  the	  gain	  in	  expected	  value	  they	  could	  have	  obtained	  
if	  they	  had	  decided	  at	  the	  optimal	  decision	  points.	  
Our	   results	   count	   against	   one	   alternate	   explanation	   of	   the	   standard	   relative	   JTC	   finding	  




participants	  take	  fewer	  draws	  to	  decision	  in	  unincentivised	  variants	  could	  simply	  be	  due	  to	  
these	   participants	   being	   less	   motivated	   than	   controls	   to	   persevere	   with	   a	   seemingly	  
worthless	   task	   and	   in	   more	   of	   a	   “rush”	   to	   end	   the	   study	   (White	   and	   Mansell,	   2009).	  
Although	  our	  replication	  of	  the	  standard	  relative	  finding	  in	  a	  fully	  incentivised	  variant	  of	  the	  
task	  casts	  doubt	  on	  this	  explanation,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  exogenous	  incentives	  or	  disincentives	  
(e.g.,	  intrinsic	  motivation	  to	  perform	  well,	  fatigue)	  were	  nevertheless	  still	  confounded	  with	  
delusion-­‐proneness	   in	   this	   study.	   In	   other	   words,	   the	   subjective	   cost	   of	   sampling	   further	  
information	   could	   have	   been	   greater	   for	   delusion-­‐prone	   participants	   –	   equal	   explicit	  
incentives	  notwithstanding	  –	  which	  might	  have	  led	  them	  to	  decide	  earlier.	  In	  an	  important	  
study,	  however,	  Moutoussis	  et	  al.	   (2011)	  analysed	  data	  from	  an	  unincentivised	  beads	  task	  
using	   a	   costed-­‐Bayesian	   model	   and	   found	   no	   support	   for	   this	   “high-­‐sampling-­‐cost	  
hypothesis”.	  
Although	  our	   findings	  align	  with	  the	  notion	  that	   low-­‐delusion-­‐prone	  participants	  are	  more	  
“conservative”	   than	   high-­‐delusion-­‐prone	   participants	   (Dudley	   et	   al.,	   1997a),	   the	   fact	   that	  
even	   low-­‐delusion-­‐prone	  participants	   jumped	   to	   conclusions	   in	   our	   incentivised	   draws-­‐to-­‐
decision	   paradigm	   is	   surprising	   given	   previous	   evidence	   of	   generally	   “conservative”	   belief	  
revision	   in	   healthy	   participants	   (e.g.,	   Phillips	   and	   Edwards,	   1966).	   However,	   Van	   der	   Leer	  
and	  McKay	   (2014)	  have	  recently	  shown	  that	   incentivising	  a	  probability	  estimate	  variant	  of	  
the	   task	   –	   in	   which	   participants	   were	   shown	   a	   fish	   from	   the	   fisherman’s	   catch	   and	   then	  
supplied	  probability	  estimates	  for	  each	  lake	  –	  led	  low-­‐delusion-­‐prone	  participants	  to	  provide	  
probability	   estimates	   not	   significantly	   different	   from	   Bayesian	   probabilities,	   while	   high-­‐
delusion-­‐prone	   participants	   still	   deviated	   from	   this	   objectively	   rational	   norm	   despite	   the	  




al.,	  2007,	  Moritz	  et	  al.,	  2006,	  White	  and	  Mansell,	  2009,	  Averbeck	  et	  al.,	  2011),	  implying	  that	  
participants	  –	  particularly	  those	  prone	  to	  delusions	  –	  might	  behave	  less	  conservatively	  than	  
their	   estimates	   of	   relevant	   probabilities	   suggest	   they	   should.	   Future	   investigations	   with	  
clinical	  populations	  may	  shed	  further	  light	  on	  this	  possibility.	  Given	  that	  delusional	  patients	  
gather	  even	  less	  evidence	  than	  delusion-­‐prone	  participants	  (Warman	  et	  al.,	  2007),	  we	  might	  
expect	   deviations	   from	   optimal	   decisions	   to	   be	   even	   more	   pronounced	   for	   delusional	  




That	   delusional	   ideation	   is	   associated	   with	   “jumping	   to	   conclusions”	   on	   probabilistic	  
reasoning	  tasks	  is	  almost	  a	  received	  view	  in	  psychiatry	  (Huq	  et	  al.,	  1988,	  Colbert	  and	  Peters,	  
2002,	   Fine	   et	   al.,	   2007,	   Garety	   and	   Freeman,	   2013).	  We	   adopted	   stringent	   experimental	  
economics	  methods	   to	  minimise	  effects	  of	  potential	   confounds	  and,	  crucially,	   to	  generate	  
rationally	   optimal	   decision	   points.	   Our	   procedure	   provides	   a	   generalised	   method	   of	  
instantiating	  and	  computing	  optimal	  decision	  points,	  given	  any	  permutation	  of	  ratios,	  costs,	  
and	   rewards	   (see	   Appendix).	   We	   found	   that	   nearly	   all	   of	   our	   participants	   jumped	   to	  
conclusions,	   deciding	   before	   it	   was	   optimal	   to	   do	   so	   (from	   a	   risk-­‐neutral	   perspective).	  
Nevertheless,	   this	   tendency	   was	   greater	   the	   more	   delusion-­‐prone	   participants	   were.	   No	  
previous	  beads	  task	  investigation	  has	  included	  both	  rewards	  for	  correct	  decisions	  and	  costs	  
for	   gathering	   information	   –	   the	   most	   that	   could	   justifiably	   be	   claimed	   from	   draws-­‐to-­‐
decision	  studies	  utilising	  standard	  unincentivised	  paradigms	  is	  that	  delusional	  and	  delusion-­‐




support	  and	  clarify	  the	  claim	  that	  delusional	  ideation	  is	  associated	  with	  a	  tendency	  to	  “jump	  






Calculation	  of	  optimal	  decision	  points11	  
First	  we	  introduce	  some	  notation: 
w 	   :	   The	  event	  that	  the	  next	  fish	  caught	  is	  white	  
b 	   :	   The	  event	  that	  the	  next	  fish	  caught	  is	  black	  
W 	   :	   The	  event	  that	  the	  true	  lake	  is	  “White”,	  the	  lake	  with	  predominately	  white	  fish	  
B 	   :	   The	  event	  that	  the	  true	  lake	  is	  “Black”,	  the	  lake	  with	  predominately	  black	  fish	  
wn 	   :	   The	  number	  of	  white	  fish	  caught	  so	  far	  
bn 	   :	   The	  number	  of	  black	  fish	  caught	  so	  far	  
Δ 	   = 	   bw nn − 	  
Δʹ′ 	   = 	   The	  value	  of	  Δ 	  after	  catching	  one	  more	  fish	  
l 	   :	  
The	  event	  that	  the	  next	  fish	  is	  of	  the	  currently	  “leading”	  fish	  colour	  
( wl = 	  if	   bw nn > 	  and	   bl = 	  if	   bw nn < )	  
L 	   :	  
The	  event	  that	  the	  true	  lake	  is	  the	  currently	  “leading”	  lake	  
( WL = 	  if	   bw nn > 	  and	   BL = 	  if	   bw nn < )	  
p 	   = 	   0.5>)|Pr(=)|Pr( BbWw 	  
ρ 	   = 	   1>)/(1 pp − 	  
π 	   :	   The	  probability	  of	  making	  a	  correct	  guess	  if	  guessing	  now	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  Our	  model	   is	  essentially	  a	  special	  case	  of	   the	  costed-­‐Bayesian	  model	  analysed	  by	  Moutoussis	  et	  al.	   (2011)	  
where	  we	   assume	   agents	   to	   act	   as	   in	   classical	   decision	   theory	   and	   classical	   game	   theory,	   rather	   than	   as	   in	  




c 	   :	   The	  cost	  of	  seeing	  one	  more	  fish	  
R 	   :	   The	  reward	  for	  a	  correct	  guess	  
 
Suppose	  that	   n 	  fish	  have	  been	  caught	  so	  far,	  of	  which	   wn 	  are	  white	  and	   bn 	  are	  black.	  We	  
are	  interested	  in	  the	  probability	  that	  the	  true	  lake	  is	  White,	  conditional	  on	  having	  caught	   wn 	  
white	  fish:	   )),(|Pr( bw nnW 	  (note	  that )),(|Pr(1=)),(|Pr( bwbw nnWnnB − ).	  We	  find	  this	  using	  










Because	  we	  have	  assumed	  a	  diffuse	  prior	  (i.e.,	  participants	  are	  informed	  that	  both	  lakes	  are	  






































Inserting	   these	   expressions	   into	   the	   formula	   for	   )),(|Pr( bw nnW 	   and	   dividing	   through	   by	  















	   (1) 
Note	   that	   ( )bnwnbwbw nnWnnB −+− ρ11/=)),(|Pr(1=)),(|Pr( .	   Because	   0.5>p ,	  
1>ρ ,	   so	   that	   )),(|Pr(>)),(|Pr( bwbw nnBnnW 	   if	   and	   only	   if	   bw nn > .	   Therefore,	   if	   the	  
decision	  maker	  decides	  to	  make	  a	  guess,	  she	  should	  always	  guess	  the	  lake	  corresponding	  to	  




































Note	  that	  this	  simplifies	  to	  the	  following	  extremely	  simple	  rule,	  where	  the	  probability	  of	  a	  
correct	  guess	  depends	  only	  on	  the	  absolute	  value	  of	  the	  difference	  of	  the	  numbers	  of	  white	  
and	  black	  fish	  caught	  so	  far:	   
	   	   (2) 
It	  follows	  that	  the	  only	  relevant	  state	  variable	  for	  our	  problem	  is	   Δ ,	  and	  we	  can	  write	  the	  
value	  function	  as	   )(ΔV .	  Here	   )(ΔV 	   is	  the	  expected	  value	  to	  the	  decision	  maker	  of	  having	  
observed	  Δ 	  more	  fish	  of	  one	  colour	  than	  of	  the	  other.	  As	  in	  any	  stopping-­‐time	  problem,	  this	  
value	   is	   the	   maximum	   of	   (1)	   the	   expected	   value	   of	   guessing	   immediately	   and	   (2)	   the	  
expected	  option	  value	  of	  seeing	  one	  more	  fish. 
The	  only	  missing	  element	  remaining	  in	  the	  formulation	  of	  this	  problem	  is	  the	  state	  transition	  
matrix.	  This,	  however,	   is	  easy	  to	  find.	  Clearly,	   if	  one	  more	  fish	   is	  caught,	   Δ 	  will	  change	  to	  
.= where,
1






either	   1+Δ 	   or	   1−Δ .	   Furthermore,	   if	   0=Δ ,	   the	   change	   will	   be	   to	   1=1= +ΔΔʹ′ 	   with	  
probability	  one.	   If	   1>Δ ,	  the	  probability	  of	   it	  changing	  to	   1+Δ 	   is	  simply	  the	  probability	  of	  
getting	  one	  more	  fish	  of	  the	  currently	  leading	  colour:	   
( ) )).()(1(1)(=)|Pr()|Pr(=1=Pr Δ−−+Δ¬++ΔΔʹ′ ππ ppLlLl  












	   (3) 
Now,	   we	   are	   ready	   to	   formulate	   the	   Bellman	   equation	   for	   the	   optimal	   stopping	   time	  
problem.	   The	  expected	   value	  of	   guessing	  now	   is	   R⋅Δ)(π .	   The	  expected	   value	  of	   drawing	  
one	  more	  fish	  is	   cVV −−Δ+ΔΔʹ′−++Δ+ΔΔʹ′ 1)(1))=(Pr(11)(1)=(Pr .	  The	  value	  function	  is	  
therefore	  defined	  recursively	  by: 
	   }.1)(1))=(Pr(11)(1)=(Pr;)({max=)( cVVRV −−Δ+ΔΔʹ′−++Δ+ΔΔʹ′ΔΔ π 	   (4) 
This	  equation	  is	  easy	  to	  solve	  by	  value	  function	  iteration.	  It	  can	  also	  be	  proven	  analytically	  
that	  the	  stopping	  rule	  will	  always	  take	  the	  form	  “Stop	  if	  and	  only	  if	   0> ΔΔ ”	  for	  some	   .	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Table	   1:	   The	   sequences	   of	   fish	   in	   the	   various	   trials	   (b=black	   fish;	   w=white	   fish);	   optimal	  
decision	  points	  are	  underlined.	  Also	  shown	  are	  the	  number	  of	  participants	  who	  decided	  on	  
the	  White	  lake	  (W)	  and	  on	  the	  Black	  lake	  (B),	  after	  each	  fish.	  Numbers	  shaded	  in	  light	  grey	  
represent	  equivocal	  errors;	  numbers	  shaded	  in	  dark	  grey	  represent	  inconsistent	  errors	  (see	  
Jolley	  et	  al.,	  2014).	  	  
	   Sequence	  A	   Sequence	  B	   Sequence	  C	   Sequence	  D	   Sequence	  E	  






























1	   b	   3	   13	   b	   5	   10	   b	   5	   16	   w	   13	   5	   b	   4	   20	  
2	   w	   1	   1	   w	   2	   3	   w	   1	   2	   b	   1	   2	   w	   2	   1	  
3	   b	   2	   28	   w	   28	   0	   b	   2	   24	   b	   1	   31	   b	   0	   16	  
4	   b	   0	   42	   w	   41	   0	   b	   0	   40	   w	   1	   2	   w	   2	   1	  
5	   b	   0	   13	   w	   17	   0	   w	   0	   2	   b	   0	   12	   w	   14	   0	  
6	   b	   0	   9	   w	   6	   0	   b	   0	   10	   b	   1	   29	   b	   1	   2	  
7	   b	   0	   0	   w	   0	   0	   b	   0	   7	   b	   0	   9	   b	   0	   11	  
8	   b	   0	   0	   w	   0	   0	   b	   0	   3	   b	   0	   4	   b	   1	   16	  
9	   b	   0	   0	   w	   0	   0	   b	   0	   0	   b	   0	   1	   b	   0	   17	  
10	   b	   0	   0	   w	   0	   0	   b	   0	   0	   b	   0	   0	   b	   0	   4	  
11	   b	   0	   0	   w	   0	   0	   b	   0	   0	   b	   0	   0	   b	   0	   0	  
12	   b	   0	   0	   w	   0	   0	   b	   0	   0	   b	   0	   0	   b	   0	   0	  
13	   b	   0	   0	   w	   0	   0	   	   	   	   b	   0	   0	   b	   0	   0	  
14	   b	   0	   0	   w	   0	   0	   	   	   	   b	   0	   0	   b	   0	   0	  
15	   b	   0	   0	   	   	   	   	   	   	   b	   0	   0	   b	   0	   0	  
16	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   b	   0	   0	   	   	   	  
17	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   b	   0	   0	   	   	   	  
	  




Table	  2:	  Descriptive	  statistics	  for	  risk	  aversion,	  PDI-­‐scores,	  and	  APM-­‐scores.	  	  





6	   5.41	   1.732	   0-­‐9	  
PDI-­‐scores	   68.5	   75.06	   40.611	   10-­‐253	  
APM-­‐
scores	  





Table	   3:	  Optimal	   decision	   points	   and	  mean	   (SD)	   draws	   to	   decision	   in	   each	   sequence,	   for	  
both	  the	  full	  sample	  (n=112)	  and	  for	  the	  two	  outer	  quartiles	  reflecting	  low-­‐delusion-­‐prone	  
(n=26)	  and	  high-­‐delusion-­‐prone	  participants	  (n=29).	  	  























































Table	  4:	  B-­‐values,	  standard	  errors	  (SE),	  β-­‐values,	  and	  p-­‐values	  for	  each	  of	  the	  predictors	  in	  
the	  steps	  of	  the	  regression	  models	  for	  draws	  to	  decision.	  
Model	   Step	   Predictor	   b	   SE	   β	   p	  
1	   1	   PDI-­‐scores	   -­‐.166	   .071	   -­‐.219	   .021	  
2	   1	   APM-­‐scores	   .271	   .051	   .456	   <.001	  
	   	   Risk	  aversion	   .009	   .086	   .009	   .913	  
	   2	   APM-­‐scores	   .269	   .050	   .452	   <.001	  
	   	   Risk	  aversion	   -­‐.029	   .086	   -­‐.029	   .737	  
	   	   PDI-­‐scores	   -­‐.160	   .064	   -­‐.210	   .015	  
	  
	  









Figure 1: A still from the lakes-and-fish task. The fisherman displays a series of six fish from his catch, BWWBWB. 
	  









Figure 2: Average number of fish seen before making a decision graphed against standardized scores of intelligence (12-
APM), risk-aversion, and delusion-proneness (square-root transformed PDI scores). The vast majority of participants decided 
before the optimal number of fish (indicated by the dotted line).  
	  
	  
